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Constitutional Design: 
Proposals Versus Processes 
Donald L. Horowitz 
Constitution-making has become an international and comparative 
exercise in a way that it rarely was in the century before 1989. 
International' in the sense, that the involvement of experts and 
practitioners across state boundaries has been welcomed, indeed 
encouraged, to the point at which a new democracy that excluded 
foreigners entirely from its constitutional process might stamp 
itself as decidedly insular, even somewhat suspect. 'Comparative' in 
the sense that there have been attempts to learn from the experi-
ence of states and societies that are similarly situated. In 1978, dur-
ing the extended session of an elected Nigerian Constituent 
Assembly that reviewed and rewrote the product of an expert 
Constitution Drafting Committee, there was great demand for 
information about .the United States constitution (see Horowitz 
1979). The US embassy was only too happy to supply copies of the 
Federalist Papers, for which there was then a great thirst. But 
Nigerian comparative curiosity did not extend much beyond the 
United States. .The situation is changed now. The experience of 
what are seen as the world's most successful democracies is still 
sought, but so, to some extent, is the experience of states that have 
faced what are viewed as comparable problems. If the answers 
remain elusive, the questions have become far more sophisticated. 
I do not want to exaggerate the increase in the diffusion of consti-
tutional innovation across international boundaries. This is, after 
all, a process that began more than two centuries ago. The framers 
of the United States constitution were, of course, students of ancient 
republics. In the nineteenth century, Latin American states were 
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much influenced by constitutional models deriving from the United 
States. In Europe, proportional representation spread across state 
boundaries. There are many other examples of borrowed political 
institutions, including the diffusion of judicial review, mainly in the 
post-World War II period. Much, though not all, institutional bor-
rowing before 1989, however, was confined to borrower and lender 
states within the same cultural zone. The heyday of European 
nationalism, from roughly the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century, was a period in which state boundaries were, to a consider-
able degree, impervious to international institutional learning. The 
making of constitutions was regarded as an intimate act, for which 
sovereign shades should be drawn. 
By contrast, the post-1989 period has been a time of constitu-
tional liberation. In this period, democracy has been marketed 
aggressively as a product that ought to be available to everyone. 
Even if purchases of off-the-shelf varieties are a bit dangerous and 
tailor-made versions are preferred, the implication is that those 
with less experience can profit from consulting those with more. 
Western governments have been forthcoming with assistance— 
although some, fearing'being held responsible for the results, were 
slow off the mark'; a spate of non-governmental organizations has 
sprung up to meet the demand and to create it where it was slow to 
arise; the United Nations and other international organizations 
have responded; and professional bodies such as the American Bar 
Association have assembled cadres of provision merchants, lawyers, 
and judges eager to dispense ready-made constitutional clauses on 
request. If the nineteenth was the century of Christian mission-
aries, the twenty-first may become the century of constitutional 
missionaries. 
In spite of all this cross-boundary involvement and'in some ways 
because of it, constitutions that have been designed, as opposed to 
merely constructed, are difficult to find. The sheer proliferation of 
participants makes it less, rather than more, likely that a design, 
with its consistent and interlocking parts, will be produced at the 
outset and adopted at the conclusion. I shall return to a fuller dis-
cussion of impediments to realizing designed constitutions soon 
enough. Suffice it to say here that the results since 1989 do not sug-
gest the triumph of constitutional design or even of comparative 
learning, however great the, efforts have been. A study of new east 
European electoral systems, for example, concludes that their 
framers consulted foreign models and then proceeded to adopt an 
array of idiosyncratic hybrids (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998: 80). A 
similar study of sub-Saharan African electoral-system change finds 
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a good deal of change, often, surprisingly enough, change involving 
borrowing across colonial traditions but, again, no particular,pat-
tern, just a variety of purely local adaptations (Albaugh 1999). If 
constitutional design were thought, reasonably enough, to produce 
some standard solutions, locally modified, to recurrent problems, 
more discernible patterns than these would be visible. New demo-
cracies, like older democracies, seem inclined toward adopting 
hybridized, sometimes inconsistent, institutions. In the electoral 
field, a more general tendency toward hybrid systems is visible from 
Italy to Israel to Japan. This is a tendency that reflects a desire to 
graft one institution on to another rather than to design an ensem-
ble of institutions.1 Perhaps counter-intuitively, homogeneity of out^ 
come is not the hallmark of the more intense international contact 
of the current period. 
Despite international, consultations, many countries produce con-
stitutions that are more or less impervious to whatever inter-
national wisdom has been purveyed or, for -that matter, to what a 
careful examination of comparative experience might reveal. In 
spite of abundant experience, in Africa and elsewhere, showing the 
futility of prohibiting the formation of ethnically-based political 
parties, Bulgaria^ a state with large Turkish and Pamak minorities, 
adopted, such a prohibition. (When the lawfulness of the Movement 
for Rights and Freedoms, universally known as a Turkish party, 
was litigated, Bulgaria was saved from the counterproductive con-
sequences of its action by a judicial determination that what every-
one knew to be true was nonetheless false [Ganev 1997].) The 
majority of states, urged to adopt constitutional,designs of one kind 
or another, have proved to be most conservative. I shall explore the 
sources of some of this conservatism shortly. 
None of this should this be surprising. Even that most theor-
etically informed, deliberate group of men who assembled in 
Philadelphia in 1787 to reform the Articles of Confederation and 
who are credited with having produced a brilliant constitutional 
design actually improvised at every step. They abandoned reform 
for reconstruction. They composed their bicameral legislature to 
resolve an impasse between small states and large. The supremacy 
1
 Although I shall speak here of'constitutional' design, I mean to include funda-
mental political institutions, such as electoral systems, the regulation,of political 
parties, and devolution, whether or not these matters are embraced formally in the 
constitution, as sometimes they are and sometimes they are not. In Indonesia, for 
instance, new laws on all these subjects were adopted in 1999, while the 1945 con-
stitution, sacrosanct as it was, was left unchanged for the time being. The adoption 
of these laws was meant to be, and certainly was, a constitutional act. 
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of federal authority over the states was the unintended consequence 
of a dispute over a different issue (Farrand 1913: 120): The institu-
tion of judicial review was omitted from the document, was 
assumed to be inherent in it by some (Farrand 1913: 156-:-7), and 
was probably not contemplated by others. The presidency, truly an 
original contribution to government, was the result of a coup 
against the majority of the constitutional convention by partisans of 
a strong executive operating in two committees of the convention; 
most delegates were wary of executive power, believing that parlia-
ment was the palladium of liberty (see Horowitz 1987:10-11; Thach 
1969: 118). The framers of 1787 could justify the design that 
emerged, but they could hardly claim to have planned the result. 
If it is true that designs are not generally adopted, that does not 
render constitutional design an unimportant subject. It is a naive 
view of the relation of ideas to institutions that concludes that ideas 
are unimportant merely because institutions do not reflect them 
fully or quickly. The difficult path of democracy itself, from 1680 to 
1789 to 1989, makes this clear enough. Ideas are contested by other 
ideas, ideas are met with a variety of non-ideational barriers, and 
even ideas that survive these tests must go further: they must be 
put in adoptable forms, they must be legitimized by opinion leaders 
and opinion-leading states, and they must be seen to be in the inter-
ests of those who must approve their adoption before they find their 
way into institutions. In the case of constitutional design, the battle 
of ideas is not over, non-ideational obstacles are strong, it is still 
early days in terms of constitutional iterations, the interests 
affected by adoption are not uniform, and retrogression is possible 
after adoption. In the remainder of this paper, I shall expand on 
some of these themes, with particular reference to constitutional 
design for societies severely divided by ascriptive groups, whether 
the lines of division are said to be national, ethnic; racial, or reli-
gious.2 
2
 By 'severely divided societies' I mean those in which ethnic-group identities 
have a high degree of salience, exceeding that accorded to alternative identities— 
including supra-ethnic, territorial, ideological; and class-based alternatives—and 
in which levels of antipathy between ethnic groups are high. This definition leaves 
open the institutional manifestations of severe divisions and so allows us to evalu-
ate the effects of constitutional designs on institutions exacerbating or mitigating 
conflict. Compare the broadly similar definition of Nordlinger (1972: 9). 
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The Contest of Ideas 
If there is a subject called constitutional design, then there must be 
alternative constitutional designs. Assuredly there are, but even 
now most constitutional drafters and reformers are, at best, only 
vaguely informed by anything resembling an articulate theory of 
their enterprise. Most act on the basis of inchoate and partially 
worked-out ideas, such as the notion that assuring legislative rep-
resentation for minorities is the crucial step in inter-group accom-
modation: a notion that has animated many judicial and legislative 
determinations under the Voting Rights Act in the United States. 
Politicians have their own ideas, and. these, are not so easily dis-
lodged1, even with the growth of constitutional design and various 
sub-fields, such as electoral-system design, as matters for experts. 
Individual politicians can still make their influence felt, even in 
very large countries.3 Before we even reach the contest of explicitly 
stated theories, we need to recognize the more significant, albeit 
often subliminal, contest between explicit theories and the more 
influential; implicit theories espoused by practitioners. The 
inarticulate theories call out for study. As of now, we. lack a theory 
of their theories. 
We also lack a consensus emerging from the articulate theories, 
whether these relate to electoral systems, presidential or parlia-
mentary structure, or the costs and benefits of centralized or 
devolved power..Lack of consensus is the first obstacle. 
No treatment of the contest of ideas can avoid an encounter with 
consociational democracy. There is much to admire in the efforts of 
Arend Lijphart in behalf of managing inter-group conflict, most 
notably his realism about group divisions (they are not to be wished 
away) and his optimism (they do notneed to produce civil war). Yet 
Lijphart, in his contribution to this volume, is right to* identify me 
as a dissenter from the consociational approach, although, as I shall 
point out, completely wrong to identify me as an opponent of either 
power-sharing or territorial devolution. I want to move on to a brief 
statement of a more promising approach and to a fuller treatment 
of the gap between constitutional design and the constitutions that 
actually emerge from processes of constitutional innovation, but I 
need first to state why I think consociational theory is not a fruitful 
path for constitutional designers. 
3
 I am thinking here of the singular part played by Viktor Shaynis, a parliament-
arian, in designing the Russian electoral system. 
20 Donald.Horowitz 
To avoid restating objections to consociationalism that I have 
advanced in several previous publications (Horowitz 1985: 568-76; 
1991:137-45,167-71; 1997: 439-tO; 2000: 256-9), I shall resort to 
a.list of the main objections. 
1. The consociational approach is motivationally inadequate. 
Lijphart (1977: 53, .165) identifies statesmanship as the reason 
elites will form a cartel across group lines to resolve inter-ethnic dif-
ferences. In his view, leaders are motivated by a desire to avert the 
danger of mutual destruction. But why should majority-group lead-
ers, with 60 per cent support, and the ability to gain all of political 
power in a majoritarian democracy, be so self-abnegating as to give 
some of it away to minority-group leaders? There may be instances 
of this .sort of generosity, in the face of the attractiveness of a less-
than-maximal coalition (see Riker 1962: 32-3), but the motive of 
avoiding ultimate mutual-destruction is based on a time horizon 
longer than that employed by most political leaders, who, in any 
case, are apt to think that retaining control for themselves is the 
best way to avoid disaster. On this point, Lijphart (chapter 3) now 
contends that the motive is not statesmanship but the .desire to 
enter into a coalition. This, of course, does not account for-the 
motives of leaders of majorities, who do not need coalitions, much 
less the all-inclusive or grand coalitions that Lijphart (1977) speci-
fies as a central element of the consociational prescription.4 The 
failure to make the elementary distinction between the different 
incentives of majorities and minorities, to which I shall return, is 
crucial. Even states that start out multipolar, with several ethnic 
groups, can become bipolar and bifurcated—witness the growth of 
northern versus southern groups in many African states—thus 
obviating the need for a coalition across group lines for the group 
that is slightly larger. In general, bipolar states, with a majority and 
a minority, are the more seriously conflicted. A theory, of conflict 
reduction that cannot cope with hard cases is of limited utility.5 
•
4
 ; Lijphart sometimes includes.and sometimes omits the grand-coalition require-
ment. The tendency to shift ground about the indispensable requisites of the theory 
is one of the main reasons why consociationalism attracts such strong criticism (see, 
for example, Dixon 1997; Halpern 1986). 
In the actual experience of constitutional innovators, there are some examples of 
motivation to accept consociational arrangements, but these are idiosyncratic and 
cannot be assumed to be widely distributed. Motivation always needs to be treated 
as an issue, not a given. 
5
 The claim that the bipolar (60-40) problem is rare (which Lijphart made in an 
earlier version of the paper published in this volume) cannot be sustained. In many 
developing countries, bipolar alignments emerge as a result of the amalgamation of 
group identities. 
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2. To the extent that the imputed motive is still statesmanship 
rather than self-interest, the assumption that elites in divided soci-
eties are likely to be more tolerant of other ethnic groups or less 
inclined to pursue advantage for their own group is extremely dubi-
ous. Studies of ethnocentrism show.educated elites in some countries 
to be less ethnocentric than their followers, in others more, in some 
others neither less nor more, and in still others more with respect to 
some groups and less or the same with respect to other groups (see 
Horowitz 1997: 457 n.31; 1991: 140-1 nn. 44-50). It is very risky to 
count on statesmanship (see Reilly and Reynolds 1999: 13). 
3. When leaders compromise across ethnic lines in the face of 
severe divisions, there is usually a high price to pay. Counter-elites 
arise who make an issue of the compromise, referring to it as a sell-
out. Consociational theory assumes the existence, of 'group leaders', 
but, even when groups begin with a single set of leaders, compromise 
across group lines is likely to show those leaders to be merely party 
leaders opposed by leaders of other parties seeking the support of the 
same group. The centrifugal competition for group allegiance is an 
enormous constraint on compromise across group lines, and it ren-
ders the grand coalition, under conditions of free elections, a contra-
diction in terms. Not one of the four developing countries cited by 
Lijphart (1977) as consociational—Lebanon, Malaysia, Surinam, and 
the Netherlands Antilles—had a grand coalition. Each had an inter-
ethnic coalition of some parties, opposed by other parties represent-
ing the same groups. Some of the four also violated other core 
conditions of consociational theory, such as-proportionality in alloca-
tions, proportionality in executive participation, and cultural auto-
nomy, but were claimed for the theory nonetheless. For reasons I 
shall enumerate later, it is not amiss to refer to consociational ele-
ments or consociational practices, but consociational regimes in the 
developing world are, to be generous about it, few and far between.6 
6
 The-tendency to shift the goal posts and to claim countries for the theory is 
palpable. Whenever a divided society seems to be more or less democratic and 
more or less lacking in the most severe forms of conflict, the reason must be that 
it is: consociational. India, the leading example of adversary democracy in Asia— 
and adversary democracy is the form of democracy to which consociationalism is 
juxtaposed as an alternative—is said to be consociational (Lijphart 1996). If South 
Africa settles its differences peacefully and electorally, even if it lacks central ele-
ments of consociationalism, such as minority vetoes, then South Africa must be 
consociational (Lijphart 19946). 
To be perfectly clear at the outset, it is not possible to identify states that have 
adopted ah incentives approach-^r any other coherent, conflict-reducing approach— 
across the board either. The difficulty of adopting constitutional designs in toto is 
precisely the point of this chapter. 
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Consociational theory exaggerates the latitude enjoyed by leaders in 
ethnically divided societies where free elections prevail. 
4. If the grand coalition, proportional resource allocations and 
shares of executive power, and the minority veto all encounter the 
motivational problem mentioned earlier, cultural autonomy 
encounters a different problem. Presumably, groups are to find sat-
isfaction—and power—in the ability to manage their own affairs, 
and that will contribute to stable democracy (Lijphart 1977:42; this 
volume, chapter 3). But those who work on the sources of conflict in 
ethnically-divided societies know there is more to it than that. 
Cultural' matters, such as the designation of official languages and 
official religions, and educational issues, such as languages of 
instruction, the content of curricula, and the official recognition of 
degrees from various educational streams associated with various 
ethnic groups, are habitually divisive issues in severely divided 
societies. These issues go straight to the heart of the conflict in three 
of its most important respects. To accord equal recognition to all cul-
tures, religions, and languages is to concede equal ownership of the 
state, contrary to what groups are very often willing to concede (see 
Wimmer 1997). To accord equal recognition is also to concede 
another core issue: the issue of group superiority, "which is contested 
by reference to disputes over cultural superiority and primacy. To 
accord equal recognition is, finally, to concede the issue of the ident-
ity of who will get ahead, which otherwise would be regulated by 
limitations on languages and educational streams associated with 
competitors. In short, cultural autonomy, with its implication of 
equality, is the product of the reduction of inter-ethnic conflict, not 
an ingredient of a conflict-regulating prescription at the threshold. 
5. Lijphart fails to make a critical distinction between pre-electoral 
arid post-electoral coalitions. The coalitions' recommended by con-
sociational theory are post-electoral coalitions, which no doubt entail 
compromise over the division of cabinet portfolios, but typically not 
compromise over divisive inter-ethnic issues. A better analysis 
of Lebanon and Malaysia during their most accommodative 
periods would have put the emphasis on the need of candidates, 
parties, and coalitions to attract votes across group lines, rather than 
on post-electoral compromise. In those cases and others, pre-electoral 
coalitions across group lines required compromise on ethnic issues. 
The combination of list-system proportional representation and 
political parties based on ethnic-group support does nothing to foster 
compromise on ethnic issues. The zero-sum relation of party lists to 
each other translates into a zero-sum electoral competition between 
ethnic groups (see Horowitz 1991: 167-76). 
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These criticisms suggest that when consociational arrangements 
are adopted a conflict is probably already on the wane, and they also 
point the way towards alternative power-sharing prescriptions. 
Certainly, to conflate consociation with all of power-sharing is com-
pletely unwarranted.7 Again, in setting out the outlines of an 
alternative perspective, I shall not be comprehensive, because I am 
as much concerned with the. under-explored fate of constitutional 
designs as I am with the designs themselves. 
Several points follow from what has already been said: If it is true 
that inter-group conflict involves a conflict for control and owner-
ship of the state, for group superiority, and for group success, all 
measured in relative terms, then compromise will be difficult to 
achieve. The divisive issues are hot easy to compromise. No single 
formula will assure the reduction of conflict. Progress will.be, in 
most cases, incremental and, in many of these, reversible. When 
electorates are alert to ethnic issues, as they typically are, exhorta-
tions to leaders to compromise are likely to be futile in the.absence 
of rewards for compromise. Attention needs to be devoted, therefore, 
to maximizing incentives for accommodative behaviour. For elected 
politicians, those incentives are likely to be found in the electoral; 
system..Electoral systems that reward inter-ethnic accommodation 
can be identified and can-be made to work more or less as intended 
(see Reilly 1997; see also International Crisis Group 1998; 1999). 
Where electoral rewards are present, they can provide the motiva-
tion ethnic leaders otherwise lack, they can operate even in the 
presence of ethnocentrism, and they can offset electoral losses that 
leaders anticipate as a result of making concessions to other groups. 
Where these rewards are present, they typically operate by means 
of vote-pooling arrangements: the exchange of votes by ethnically-
based parties that, because of the electoral system, are marginally 
dependent for victory on the votes of groups other than their own 
and that, to secure those votes, must behave moderately on the 
issues in conflict. The electoral rewards provided to a moderate mid-
dle compensate for the threat posed by opposition from those who 
can benefit from the aversion of some group members to inter-ethnic 
compromise. 
Where vote pooling takes place, as it did in Lebanon and Malaysia, 
it promotes pre-electoral coalitions, coalitions that need to compro-
mise in order to attract voters across group lines but that may be 
7
 Others have also pointed out that the appropriation of the term 'power-sharing* 
to refer exclusively to the consociational approach is confusing and conceptually 
constricting (see, for example, Dixon 1997: 23, 32). 
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opposed by ethnic parties on the flanks. A recent instance in which a 
vote-pooling electoral system was used successfully to induce the for-
mation of a multi-ethnic coalition that won the election was the 
alternative vote (AV), adopted in the 1997 Fijian constitution. The 
electoral incentives in Fiji were weak, but they had a powerful 
effect.8 A severely divided society, Fiji elected a thoroughly multi-
ethnic government, led by its first-ever Indian prime minister (see 
Lai 1999). A year later, that government was overthrown, but not 
because the incentives did not work. 
Incentives, then, are the key to accommodation in difficult condi-
tions, but the difficult conditions imply that the incentives approach 
will not be attractive to everyone or attractive at all times. Some 
times are more propitious than others, and the problem of motives 
does not disappear by invoking the incentives approach. The incen-
tives approach has had 'no more success in securing full-blown 
acceptance than has any other. Now the question becomes who will 
opt for this approach, when, and why. This is a problem I shall turn 
to shortly. First, however, I need to flesh out a few more implications. 
If political leaders are likely to be more willing to compromise 
under some electoral systems than under others, it follows that the 
electoral system is the central feature of the incentives approach to 
accommodation. Indeed, differing electoral logics can create differ-
ing ethnic outcomes, reversing even favourable and unfavourable 
starting points, an argument I have made in a comparison of Sri 
Lanka, which began with a relatively easy ethnic problem, and 
Malaysia, which began with a very difficult one (Horowitz 1989a). 
Vote pooling is the major, but not the only,.goal of the incentives 
approach. As the difficulty of reconciling majorities to non-
majoritarian institutions suggests; multipolar fluidity makes inter-
ethnic accommodation easier, since, by definition, it lacks a 
majority. The presence of many groups, no one of which can lay 
claim to majoritystatus, in Tanzania and India is* conducive to the 
mitigation of conflict. But group identities can change: as 1 men-
tioned earlier, a large number of groups can consolidate into a 
smaller number, and the formal'institutional structure can facil-
itate the change from multipolar fluidity to bipolar opposition. 
Where multipolarity prevails, another purpose ofthe electoral sys-
tem is to preserve it against consolidating tendencies. Among oth-
ers, the Lebanese system did this for a long time. By acknowledging 
8
 By way of disclosure, I should report that I served as a consultant to the Fijian 
Constitution Review Commission that recommended the AV system (see FCRC 
1996). Arend Lijphart was also consulted by the Commission. 
Constitutional Design 25 
the plasticity of group identities, which consociational theory com-
pletely neglects, the incentives approach can prevent the crystal-
lization of identities and the emergence of more severe conflict. 
It is not usually, recognized, however, that territory can act in aid 
of or in lieu of electoral mechanisms for such purposes. Territory can 
partition groups off from each other and direct their political ambi-
tions at one level of government rather than another. Federalism, 
and especially the,proliferation of federal units, or regional auto-
nomy can act in effect as an electoral reform and can preserve 
multipolar fluidity. There is very good evidence of this in the case of 
the proliferation of Nigerian federal units. 
Federalism and regional autonomy have other conflict-reducing 
functions as well. If the units are homogeneous, they may foster 
intra-group competition, at the expense of an exclusive focus on 
inter-group competition. If the units are heterogeneous, they may 
provide an experience in political socialization:for politicians of dif-
ferent groups who become habituated to dealing with each other at 
lower levels before they need to do so at.the centre. 
Does devolution lead to secession, as central-level politicians so 
often fear? The intervening variables here are timing and the ties 
woven with the centre. Early, generous devolution, coupled with 
carefully crafted connections of the regional population with the 
centre, is likely to avert rather than produce separatism. Late, 
grudging devolution, coupled with a view at the centre that mem-
bers of a group residing in the autonomous'territory should hence-
forth look exclusively to the regional unit for their satisfaction, is 
far more likely to encourage departure from the state. Hesitation 
about devolution, creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because of hesi-
tation, devolution often comes too late. 
Theincentives approach is as.difhcult as, or more difficult than, 
the consociational to adopt, but, once<adopted, it has an important 
advantage. Consociation is certainly easier to understand: one size 
fits all..But, even if adopted, consociation is far. from self-executing, 
because compromise is not likely to be;rewarded by the electorate. 
The matter will not be. left in elite hands. By contrast, politicians 
who benefit from electoral incentives to moderation have continuing 
reason to try to reap.those rewards, whatever their beliefs and 
whatever their inclination to toleration and statesmanship. 
Politicians who are merely exhorted to behave moderately may be 
left with mere exhortations. 
26 Donald Horowitz 
Structural Sources of Constitutional Conservatism 
Once we move past arguments about the best constitutional course 
for divided societies, hubris should subside and humility, should 
return quickly. There is ample reason, after all, to be humble. Why 
is it so easy to point out how few, if any, states have adopted com-
pletely one prescription or another? Because adoptions are likely to 
be partial at best. The processes of constitution-making are uncon-
genial to the creation of a set of institutions that derive from any 
single theory. Beyond that, there are systematic biases of constitu-
tional actors that favour and disfavour particular approaches. And 
there are variations in the positions and interests of ethnic groups 
participating in and affected by constitutional.processes. For all of 
these reasons, the result is far more likely to be the adoption of a 
mix containing elements drawn from several approaches.than-of a 
document embodying a consistent perspective and method. 
This is inadequately mapped terrain, so the best I can do is-to 
sketch some of the constraints.9 Perhaps I can begin by illustrating 
hybrid outcomes,-using an example I referred to earlier: Fiji. 
Fiji is a severely divided society with a population that is, very 
roughly, half Fijians, two-fifths Indians, and onertenth other 
minorities. After amilitary regime promulgated a quite exclusion-
ary, pro-Fijian constitution in 1990, the regime promised'a review of 
that constitution, to take place several years later. A Constitution 
Review Commission was duly appointed. In 1996, the commission 
reported (FCRC 1996). Based on its view of the benefits of the vote-
pooling approach, it recommended an AV electoral system and the 
creation of as many heterogeneous constituencies as. possible, so 
that ethnic parties would have incentives to make arrangements 
with other ethnic parties across group lines to secure the 50 per cent 
plus one that AV requires for victory.10 Fiji, however, has a.history 
of ethnically reserved seats and communal rolls, that is, the elec-
torate for each seat is limited to voters of the group for whose can-
didates the seatis reserved. The commission was unable to abolish 
these seats altogether, so it retained 25 of them in a proposed house 
of 70, leaving 45 open seats. The Fijian parliament more than 
9
 For an altogether different set of constraints, see Reilly and Reynolds (1999: 
10-19). 
10
 For the powerful incentives AV creates for voters to cross party lines—and, by 
inference, in an ethnically divided society, to cross ethnic lines—see Sartori (1997: 
5-6). Lijphart (this volume, chapter 3) mistakenly equates the incentives of AV to 
those of the majority, two-round runoff system. 
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reversed these numbers: it enacted a constitution specifying 46 
reserved seats and only 25 open seats. It also adopted a proposal 
requiring that any party securing at least 10 per cent of the seats be 
invited to be represented proportionately in the cabinet, but with-
out a veto. The British convention of majority confidence was explic-
itly retained. 
Here, then, was a hybrid constitution, drawing inspiration from 
the incentives approach, the consociatiorial approach, and the 
majoritarian approach (for a fuller treatment, see-Horowitz 2000). 
What I want to argue here is that such mixed outcomes are more 
likely than not, and I want to enumerate some of the reasons. 
The first is that there, is an.asymmetry of preferences. It should 
come as no surprise that representatives of, the Indian minority, 
weary of leading the parliamentary opposition, proposed the provi-
sion for inclusion in the Fijian cabinet. (Ironically, however, one 
Indian party did so well that it became the largest party in the coali-
tion that won the election and so did not need the provision, while 
the other Indian party did so poorly it could not take advantage of 
the provision.) The consociational approach involves guarantees, 
and minorities are more likely to favour minority guarantees. 
Majorities, however, favour majority rule. While, in this case, 
Fijians conceded a single consociational feature, they certainly did 
not concede a consociational approach. Nor did they concede the full 
thrust of the incentives approach so clearly preferred by the com-
mission. Rather, they watered it down. 
This asymmetry of preferences is systematic; i t derives from the 
exigencies of minority and majority position. But position is not the 
only source of mixed outcomes. 
Two other sources are a multiplicity of, participants and a multi-
plicity of objectives. Theorists oftenthink—correctly, in my view— 
that the dangers of ethnic conflict are so great that a nearly 
singleTininded focus on its amelioration is warranted in the design 
of institutions. Others, however, have, additional objectives. The 
more others there are, the greater is the chance that competing 
objectives will intrude and need to be accommodated. An example 
from Bosnia will make the point. While a three-member inter-
national committee worked for many months devising and testing 
an electoral system to mitigate Bosnia's ethnic conflicts, an internal 
drafting committee and some other members of the international 
community, although- also concerned about ethnic conflict, were 
equally concerned about the responsiveness of legislative 
candidates to constituents—a classic concern of the electoral-sys-
tem literature. This led to a quite different electoral proposal. This, 
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in Bosnia, a state in which there is serious apprehension of renewed 
ethnic warfare if the international community should depart. 
Now there are undoubtedly ways to narrow the composition of 
participants playing- a part in such deliberations, but. some of the 
most likely ways may not be productive. It is tempting to think that 
some form of diktat would surely produce more consistency. The 
only problem then would be to convince the author of the diktat of 
the soundness of one theory- or another. These days, however, any 
diktat that emerges is likely to emanate from international actors. 
While these often have a view of the benighted condition of the trou-
bled territories needing their Jielp, a jaundiced view that might be 
conducive to imposing some strong-medicine on their wards, inter-
national actors are exceedingly unlikely to speak with a single voice 
or, if they can find any responsible voices in.the target territories, to 
speak with any voice, at all. The possibility of a diktat that comes 
with international involvement carries with it the proliferation, 
rather than the reduction, of participants. (Never mind whether a 
diktat can produce a legitimate constitutional design: it certainly 
did in some ex-colonies.) 
What I have already said about Fiji and Bosnia also implies that 
the invocation of.expertise or the detachment of outsiders, such as 
the distinguished chair of the Fijian commission (a Maori who had 
served as governor-general and previously as archbishop of New 
Zealand), will yield a consistent product in the end. The recommen-
dations of experts and outsiders can be rejected and modified .as 
inconsistent withlocal conditions or simply as inconsistent with the 
preferences of local actors. 
If there are many actors, constitutional processes are likely to 
entail bargaining. By definition, bargaining involves the exchange 
of preferences, and that exchange is inimical to the realization of a 
single constitutional design. 
There are times when there is a discernibly different process at 
work, when a sober contemplation of unpleasant experience pro-
duces a determination to depart from-the institutions producing 
that experience. Those propitious times'needs ito'be specified'more 
precisely than they have been thus far. As I said earlier, the very 
problems that make constitutional innovation necessary generally 
impede acceptance of constitutional departures. And so a focus on 
exceptional times, hospitable to innovations, is well warranted. 
At some such times, the past has been so unpleasant and the 
future is so uncertain that the ethnic groups' sense of their own 
future interests becomes elusive. In Nigeria in 1978, groups found 
it impossible to foresee the pattern of ethnic political advantage and 
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disadvantage. Faced with the veil of ignorance, they set out to 
choose institutions they could live with regardless of future posi-
tion. Among these were a separately elected president, so that con-
trol of parliament by a single ethnic group would not be sufficient to 
exclude the rest. The president'was to be chosen by a vote-pooling 
formula involving plurality plus geographic distribution—as territ-
ory was a rough proxy for ethnicity Unfortunately, .the Nigerian 
framers did not opt for conciliatory electoral systems for legislative 
office, and so one set of institutions worked against others. 
Propitious moments may produce a suspension of interest asym-
metry, but they do not necessarily produce adequate innovations. 
Epiphanies do not compensate for all the defects of the human con-
dition, such1 as failures of information, foresight, and thoroughness. 
To .a considerable degree, the list of obstacles to constitutional 
innovation recapitulates the standard impediments to policy 
change. This, I want to suggest, is a useful function, since tidy con-
stitutional designs have generally been propounded without regard 
to untidy processes of adoption. In the terms familiar to the litera-
ture on agenda setting =(for example, Kingdon 1984; cf. Horowitz 
19896), constitutional prescriptions are solutions awaiting prob^ 
lems, but in this case the problem whose serendipitous occurrence 
produces a new receptivity to pre-existing solutions is likely to be a 
human catastrophe, such as a civil war or a hurting stalemate (see 
Zartman 1991). Neither-of these will necessarily assure the adop-
tion of any prescription in its totality. In many such dire cases, there 
is likely to be a sense that any compromise is better than no agree-
ment. This is an outcome that is highly likely to be encouraged by 
outside mediators. In short; the existence of a design does not repeal 
the laws of policy-making or negotiation. 
One.structuraLcondition is certainly conducive to constitutional 
innovation in the service of conflict reduction: monopoly position 
within one's own ethnic group. Lijphart (1977: 25) refers to 'a grand 
coalition of the political leaders of all significant, segments of the 
plural society*. Most of the time, however, it is difficult to identify a 
single set that" can be called, the political leaders of each group. 
Groups usually have more than one set contesting for leadership, 
and.this, as I have argued, is a major constraint on inter-group com-
promise. Where, however, a single set of leaders is as yet unchal-
lenged, it has, for the moment, leeway to compromise that it'would 
not otherwise enjoy. The Malaysian, compromises of the 1950s go 
back to this fortuitous structural condition. Once the compromises 
were made, however, counter-elites arose within each group to chal-
lenge them. These alternative, ethnically more exclusionary leaders 
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hemmed in the'compromising coalition partners, limiting their lat-
itude, and also drove the coalition partners together, since their 
majority increasingly depended on their ability to pool, votes with 
each other. Without monopoly position at the outset, it is unlikely 
that the initial compromises could have been made. 
In spite of all,these obstacles, including lack of monopoly, one 
recent agreement stands out by its exceptional character: the 
largely consociational agreement reached in Northern Ireland on 
Good Friday, 1998. The agreement is not perfectly consociational, 
and its early implementation involved some deviations from strict 
proportionality. Yet, on the whole, the consociational coherence of 
the document stands out. Even more remarkable are the maximal 
commitments to inter-group accommodation made by the signa-
tories. In a separate paper, based on interviews in Belfast and 
London (Horowitz 2002), I show that the Northern Ireland agree-
ment was made possible by a concatenation of exceptional circum-
stances that suspended nearly all the obstacles I'have identified 
here. 
The one obstacle not overcome at Belfast^intra-group competi-
tion—particularly on the unionist side, threatened to preclude 
agreement in the first instance and then delayed implementation of 
the agreement for a year. The principal constraint on David 
Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, was opposition not 
only from outside the UUP, from Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist 
Party, but also from inside his own caucus. The two are related. The 
existence of the DUP, criticizing compromise from the Protestant 
flank, leads members of the UUP to depart from the compromises, 
lest the exclusive appeal of the DUP draw support away. If the 
agreement does not collapse completely, the same.risk may;:materi-
alize on the Catholic side. Should there.be a shortfall of delivery on 
the maximal commitments of the agreement, the main beneficiaries 
of which are on the Catholic side, Catholic moderates of the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party stand to suffer at the hands of Sinn 
Fein, which is likely to outflank them'on such issues. 
The actual workings of a regime of this sort are, therefore, made 
quite precarious by intra-ethnic divisions. In particular, when parties 
of the middle cannot count on electoral .support from their partners 
in compromise, in order to offset losses incurred within their group as 
a-result of the compromises, they will proceed haltingly at best, and 
they may be caught in centrifugal processes initiatedJby their intra-
group competitors. That is a strong reason why intra-group monopoly 
is best at the outset (though it will not last); it is also a reason why 
vote-pooling mechanisms are exceedingly helpful. And it is also.a 
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reason why there can be no guarantees of success for any prescription 
or mix of prescriptions: compare Reynolds (19996: 5). 
Which Models, Which Histories? Sources of Bias 
The process of constitutional choice is fraught with the prospect of 
bias and distortion. Two of the more prominent sources of skewed 
choice concern the relative attractiveness of alternative constitu-
tional models across states and the interpretation of constitutional 
experience.within states. The pitfalls, therefore, are inappropriate 
comparison and misinterpreted history. 
In cross-state comparisons, there are, in turn, at least four 
sources of difficulty. The first is a preference for the best or most 
successful cases. The second is a preference for source countries of 
colonial, cultural, or regional affinity. The third is a preference for 
single outstanding examples, at the expense of a run of-dissonant 
examples. The fourth is a preference of international actors for 
home-country institutions. 
As Nigerians looked to the United States in 1978, so, too, have 
many countries aimed to resemble Switzerland rather than 
Nigeria, even though their problems may have resembled-Nigeria's 
more than Switzerland's. Success attracts admirers, although suc-
cess may imply an easier problem that may have made possible the 
adoption of institutions that are held, in retrospect, to be responsi-
ble for the success. Severely divided societies need to look to other 
severely divided societies that have made some progress, in reduc-
ing conflict, rather than to societies that are less severely divided, 
especially if the reduction of divisions in the less divided countries 
can causally be attributed to political institutions that antedate the 
onset of democracy. 
Anglophone countries in Africa and elsewhere generally express 
an affinity for British institutions; Francophone countries, for 
French institutions, such as the presidency with two-round'elec-
tions. Post-colonial conditions can and do change, but powerful 
networks, habits, and pressures can retard the change. The same 
goes for the English-speaking world's general, albeit imperfect, 
allergy to list-system proportional representation and comparable 
aversions to other systems in other cultural zones. Inter-regional 
boundaries also constitute powerful impediments to constitutional 
borrowing. Bosnia's and Northern Ireland's cleavages may be 
similar in structure and in severity to those of some Asian and 
African countries, but in neither have constitutional designers 
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'been inclined to look east or south for models. There is not yet 
completely free trade, in constitutional innovation. 
A more subtle source of difficulty derives from a different selection 
bias. Those with an interest in a specific innovation may focus on a 
single attractive case, to the neglect of the range of relevant out-
comes. Take the case of Tatarstan, which in the early 1990s aimed to 
secure a specially favourable, asymmetric federal arrangement with 
Moscow. Policy-makers in Kazan focused on a model far from home: 
the relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, which, 
not surprisingly, seemed remarkably favourable -to the peripheral 
territory. They neglected the relevance of several other cases in which 
asymmetrical federal arrangements, conceded when necessary^ for 
the centre to forge the association, were diminished or revoked when 
the centre was in a position to do so: Cameroon, Ethiopia-Eritrea, 
Peninsular Malaysia-Borneo Malaysia. This is, of course, an instance 
of the -bias toward success and perhaps also of a geographical-
cultural bias. It is also, however, something more subtle: a bias 
toward the more visible and against the less visible, the same bias 
that, has made South Africa conspicuous in debates in Northern 
Ireland (Guelke 1999). 
Finally, there is a nearly imperceptible.but, in some cases, palpa-
bly important source of skewing among international actors: the 
bias of international bureaucrats toward home-country institu^ 
tions. To the extent that so-called failed states become wards of 
international actors, those states may find themselves subject to the 
democratic forms and processes of the leading custodian states. 
Hence, for example, reports of American military authorities who 
conduct ad hoc judicial proceedings along home-country lines in 
Kosovo. The same is undoubtedly true in constitutional design. 
There is also a subset of home-country bias: a preference for the 
institutions of a state in which decision-makers have studied'. 
Indonesian decision-makers, educated in the United States, had a 
preference for plurality elections in single-member constituencies 
and for electoral commissions that included representatives of the 
contesting political parties. The latter innovation made for great 
delay and doubt about the count in the 1999 general elections, as an 
.unwieldy commission sought to cope with objections from officials of 
literally scores of parties.11 
People bring with them what they know and what they are habit-
uated to. How all this plays outas unclear in a multinational occu-
pation or in,the increasingly common situation in which advice is 
11
 -I am grateful to Ben Reilly for calling the source of this difficulty to me. 
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taken from several sources, but competing home-country biases are 
unlikely simply to cancel each other out. The biases may, however, 
interact in peculiar ways with adoptions based on other biases. In 
the early 1990s, Nepal opted for- first-past-the-post elections, 
because it wished to emulate the experience of its powerful neigh-
bour, India. It also wished to discourage party fragmentation. 
Consequently, on the recommendation 'of a German adviser, Nepal 
adopted a 3 per cent threshold; but, of course, such a.threshold sits 
uneasily with single-member constituencies in which the threshold 
for victory is. already determined to~be a plurality virtually certain 
to exceed 3 per cent. Nepalese decisiommakers, therefore, decided 
that a party securing less than 3 per cent of the vote would be ineli? 
gible to run candidates in the next election—a rule that also proved 
attractive for the same reasons, but without the German adviser, in 
Indonesia in 1999.12 
Examples of this sort raise the more general question of inter-
action effects. If hybrid institutions are produced by asymmetrical 
preferences, processes of exchange, and multiple.-source biases, it 
becomes more difficult, to predict the incentives they create (see 
Shvetsova 1999). 
Model biases are an instance of reference-group behaviour (Turner 
1956). Those who search for models, personal or institutional, do not 
cast a net indiscriminately. They emulate or borrow selectively from 
donors thought to be appropriate sources of values or ways of con^ 
ducting business. This is an old, but under-appreciated, story in the 
transference of legal systems across -boundaries (see, for example, 
Watson 1985: 23).. In the quest for the best institutions, students of 
the subject have neglected the. subterranean screening that takes 
place in processes of.constitutional adoption. 
The study of the subject does not end with model bias. There is also 
historical bias to contend with. Although state decision-makers may 
learn something from the experience of other states, they inevitably 
have already learned something from their own historical experi-
ence. This they will bring to the table, whether or not they are con-
scious of.it. Again, the American presidency is a good example. The 
nature of this office was uncertain until the end of the 1787 conven-
tion, because there was differential experience among the delegates. 
Many delegates, recalling the imperiousness of the British Crown, 
wanted a weak executive. Many others, who had recently witnessed 
what they saw as unbridled legislative domination and popular 
12
 I am indebted to Jorgen Elklit for the Nepalese example, but the interpreta-
tion is my responsibility. 
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revolt/ culminating in Shays' Rebellion, feared populist legislative 
supremacy. A third, group, ultimately decisive, came from the few 
states that had had strong executives during the Articles of 
Confederation period. Their experience proved decisive, as they cap-
tured the crucial committees that resolved the issues (Thach. 1969). 
One set of. delegates was focused on Britain, a second on develop-
ments in some states, a third on developments in others. Each 
thought its slice of history definitive. 
It is, however, not experience alone that is decisive, but how 
experience is filtered and interpreted, how some events are remem-
bered and others are forgotten, and how transcendent,moments in 
the past are invoked to make them relevant to present problems 
(Fentress and Wickham 1992: 127-37). As Nigerians associated 
their catastrophic conflicts with the easy capture of parliament and 
so looked favourably on a separation of powers, others may associ-
ate past problems with dictatorial presidents, and that may lead 
them in a parliamentary direction (see Horowitz 1990). There is an 
emerging literature on the role of historical memory in fostering 
conflict (see, for example, Posen 1993), but none yet on its impact in 
discriminating among institutional designs. 
Yet memory weighs on policy-makers, and memory is subject to 
bias. Those who adopted ^the institutions agreed for Northern 
Ireland on Good Friday 1998 believed that everything else had been 
tried; in the process, they arguably misinterpreted Northern 
Ireland's previous failures, especially the failure of the so-called 
power-sharing government of 1973-4 (see Horowitz 2002). In 
Indonesia, drafters of the electoral and political parties laws 
enacted in 1999 were much concerned to avoid the danger of.a frag-
mented parliament, and they drafted strong provisions to prevent 
regional or ethnic parties from securing a parliamentary foothold. 
In doing so, they were moved by what they saw as the deadlock 
of the 1955 parliament, the only freely-elected parliament in 
Indonesia's history. It is.natural, perhaps, that the drafters should 
have looked for lessons to the only pertinent previous elections. 
Nevertheless, the degree of fragmentation in the 1955 parliament 
was not unmanageable. The admittedly non-electoral experience of 
1965, when bifurcation and polarization overtook the Indonesian 
state, with truly disastrous consequences, was at least equally rele-
vant but utterly neglected by the drafters (Horowitz 1999). In the 
short run, the drafters were right, as fragmentation has outweighed 
polarization as a problem, both in and out of parliament, but the 
cleavage between secular nationalists and Muslims can hardly be 
said to have been bridged permanently, any more than the cleavage 
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between the armed forces and the communists was in 1965. The 
prevention of polarization may yet be an important purpose of con-
stitutional design in Indonesia. 
Lessons that policy-makers draw are almost always partial, and 
the sources of skewing in one case will certainly not be identical to 
those in another (cf. Jervis 1976: 218-20, 274-5; John Anderson 
1990: 239-42). If there is, for the moment,'peace but none the less 
pessimism, as in Bosnia, there will be great risk aversion, and expe-
rience will be interpreted to make only small changes possible. But 
the full repertoire, of recipes for hospitality to innovation in one 
direction or another has yet to be uncovered. The combination of 
model bias and historical bias in individual countries opens the way 
to a great many permutations of institutions rather than anything 
resembling homogeneity. Designers who propound one-size-fits-all 
prescriptions will be especially disappointed. 
Constitutional Spillage 
It is one thing to prescribe and quite another to take the medicine. 
I have been emphasizing here the slip between the constitutional 
cup and the adoptive lip: the spillage rates are great, but our know-
ledge of them is thus far so primitive that we can only regard 
spillage as being close to random in its incidence and configuration. 
There is the further problem of retrogression. Designs have 
effects on the distribution of power, and those who gain power as a 
result may wish to alter the design to favour themselves. Of course, 
it is possible to build in safeguards or tripwires that make alter-
ations difficult or set off alarms when attempts are made. But the 
looser the design and the easier the adoption, the easier the alter-
ation as well. Slippage is not complete at the moment of adoption. 
Certain electoral systems, for example, depend for their contin-
ued efficacy on constituency boundaries. Electoral results can be 
changed without changing the electoral system itself, by altering 
those boundaries. The integrity of the design, therefore, will depend 
on the integrity of the boundary delimitation process. In Malaysia, 
where vote pooling was the fortuitous product of an unusual pattern 
of intra-ethnic party monopoly, inter-ethnic party competition, and 
demographic imbalances (see Horowitz 1985:398-404), rather than 
constitutional design, the emergence of a strong Malay party in the 
ruling coalition produced changes in electoral boundaries that 
made Chinese voters less important (Lim 1997). As Chinese votes 
became less important to the coalition, Chinese political influence 
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declined. Yet, in spite of the new boundaries, when Malays became 
more divided, marginal Chinese votes for Malay candidates became 
more valuable again, and this was reflected in ethnic policy and 
electoral appeals, most recently in the 1999 elections: The revival of 
Chinese influence, I cannot resist emphasizing, points to the utility 
of vote-pooling incentives as a source of accommodation, even in the 
face of retrogression. 
Everything 1 have said thus far is intended to .highlight the 
unlikelihood that constitutional designs can or will-be adopted or, if 
adopted, retained in anything resembling their original form. I have 
assumed that this shortfall is as dangerous to divided societies as 
shortfalls in construction are to buildings designed by architects. 
But, of course, this assumption is really a conceit. Although some 
constitutional designers see the adoption of designs as an elite mat-
ter, this cannot really be the case (see Tsebelis 1990: 12). There are 
attentive voters, and most constitutional reformers contemplate 
facing election. If designs were really adopted in unmodified form, 
their democratic legitimacy might be at risk. The hash that is made 
of designs in the process of adoption may make conflict reduction 
much more difficult than it might be, but there may be some com-
pensating advantages. A messy process of adoption, replete with 
design-destroying reciprocity, may give rise at least to a sense of 
local ownership of the product,13 even if the institutions fall short of 
what is required to mitigate conflict. 
Many states will inevitably make do with what they have or what 
they acquire in fits and starts: inherited institutions, patched-
together institutions, partial adoptions, and strange hybrids. Their 
conflicts may continue, perhaps intermittently; they may change 
course, as they have in Nigeria (Suberu 1993: 42-4); or they 
may abate. In the. most fortuitous cases—Thailand and Taiwan 
conspicuous among them—ethnic cleavages may decline greatly in 
salience as a by-product of other political changes. Political institu-
tions, the sort embodied in constitutions, are very powerful deter-
minants of the course of conflict, but fortunately they are not the 
only ones. 
13
 It is, of course, easy to exaggerate the lack of legitimacy enjoyed by imported 
or imposed institutions. Counter-evidence can be supplied by reference to the 
healthy status of the MacArthur Constitution in Japan or of a number of constitu-
tions imposed by colonial powers. They are many ways to indigenize, and so claim 
ownership, of external models, short of rejecting or radically reconfiguring them. 
